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Recent events are again raising some old issues and creating new opportunities regarding 
the future disposition of the used, or spent, fuel from nuclear power plants. Handling 
these challenges well will not only help set the stage for a robust nuclear energy future, 
but will reflect the growing linkages among nuclear power, nuclear waste management, 
international security, and public and political acceptance. The emerging global nuclear 
regime may make spent fuel management not only more important, but improve chances 
of success. 
 
Today’s context 
 
Today, some 441 nuclear reactors operating in over 30 countries supply approximately 
16% of the world’s electricity. They were built in less than 50 years, an impressively 
rapid introduction rate of a new technology when compared with the time it took for 
previous major energy contributors like coal and oil to achieve similar market 
penetration. 
 
In many respects, however,  nuclear power growth reached a plateau 10-15 years ago. 
More recently the introduction of new plants, the spread to new countries, and the 
development of key elements of the fuel cycle such as enrichment, reprocessing, and 
waste disposal have been quite modest. However, it seems that a renewed growth and 
spread of nuclear power plants and associated fuel cycle facilities and activities may 
begin soon, perhaps in the coming decade. The drivers are several: the certain growth of 
energy demand, particularly for electricity in the developing world; the increasing 
awareness of growing competition for energy sources and the concomitant enhanced 
desire for security in national energy supply; the increasingly obvious conclusion that 
burning of fossil fuels for energy is a major contributor to global warming and 
environmental degradation; the location of many of the world’s largest oil and gas 
reserves in politically risky states; and the unpredictable and often rising costs of 
alternative energy sources such as oil and gas. 
 
An expected resurgence of nuclear power carries with it the need to overcome a series of 
hurdles that have been well articulated in many places. The needs include assured 
financing for plants that are expensive and capital intensive, economic forecasts that 
demonstrate reasonable returns on investment, licensing regimes that provide confidence 
in timely processes and decisions, public acceptance in a world that still remembers 
Three Mile Island and Chernobyl, unquestioned continued quality performance and 
attention to safety, and the development of a nuclear regime that allows for the growth 
and spread of nuclear power while reducing prospects for nuclear proliferation and 
terrorism. 
 
Not included in the above list is a key challenge: a demonstrated solution to the disposal 
of the high-level radioactive waste contained in the spent fuel. Whether the spent fuel 
elements are disposed of directly or the fuel is reprocessed to extract and reuse the 
remaining uranium and produced plutonium, there is today no operating facility for 
permanent disposal. The wastes must be carefully and safely managed. Fortunately, the 
track record gives high confidence, as the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission has 
stated, that spent fuel elements can be safely stored either in water pools or dry casks for 
decades. Yet the radioactivity remains a potential hazard for millennia, and it is generally 
agreed that one cannot count on institutional control to isolate the waste for the many 
thousands of years to come. 
 
In 1957, a U.S. National Academy of Sciences report recommended that high-level 
radioactive wastes (HLW), such as those in spent reactor fuel, could be safely and 
permanently disposed of in deep, stable geological formations. They reasoned that since 
there are many places in the world where the geology has been stable for millions of 
years, finding and demonstrating a suitable location would be a preferred solution. 
Remarkably, almost 50 years later, this conclusion remains the anticipated ultimate 
solution for essentially every country that has a mature program. While other ideas have 
been generated and studied for decades, they have been found wanting. They are at a 
much too early, “romantic” stage to depend on; they require extensive, costly, and highly 
uncertain research programs; and even if successful they will not eliminate but only  
diminish the needs for an ultimate repository.  
 
Yet developing and opening a geologic repository is difficult. Many countries with 
nuclear power programs have or had significant repository programs, but with a few 
exceptions (Finland and perhaps Sweden), they have had major setbacks in progress and 
schedule (e.g. U.S., France, Canada, Switzerland, Germany, Spain, and Great Britain).  
 
The reasons for difficulties are many and varied, but two stand out. First, there is the 
scientific and technical challenge of demonstrating to a licensing authority and skeptical 
public that the natural and engineered barriers in the repository location deep 
underground can be relied upon to isolate the waste for the time period during which it is 
hazardous—many tens, perhaps hundreds of thousands of years.  
 
Second is the political, institutional, and public challenge of siting; that is, achieving 
acceptance for any location as the site of a nation’s nuclear waste final repository. High-
level radioactive waste is a third rail of local, regional, and often national politics. Public 
reaction and opposition is often so intense that affected politicians have only two choices: 
oppose every effort to consider their jurisdictions or look for a new vocation. In general, 
these institutional challenges appear to be greatest in countries, like the U.S., with the 
equivalent of strong State government. While local communities near a candidate site 
may see benefits in job creation, technology, and compensation, sites are by their nature 
usually in remote locations. The population and political centers within a State are 
elsewhere and tend to focus much more on the perceived environmental consequences 
and societal stigma of being a repository, particularly when the wastes have been created 
elsewhere. 
 
Prospects for Success 
 
So how can we improve chances of successfully building a HLW repository that protects 
the public and earns their trust and confidence? 
 
Let’s begin by reviewing some of the key conclusions of one seminal document on the 
subject, “Rethinking High-Level Waste,” prepared by a U.S. National Academy of 
Sciences committee in 1990, with extensive international participation. The study was 
prompted by continuing frustration and lack of sustained progress in the U.S. repository 
program, which by that time had been focused on one site alone: Yucca Mountain, a  
remote location 100 miles northwest of Las Vegas.  
 
The Academy report concluded that the U.S. program at the time was unlikely to succeed 
largely because it did not take into consideration and accommodate the unique feature of 
this first-of-a-kind, highly controversial program. Schedules and budgets had been laid 
out as if we knew in advance everything that would be required, including the time and 
effort necessary to resolve the unknowns. The program was too inflexible and 
prescriptive. And when the inevitable technical and institutional surprises arose, the 
tendency was to grudgingly modify the program expectations with another highly 
optimistic and prescriptive program which once again had a rigid schedule and 
anticipated that we could design a “perfect” program in advance. It was often said that 
“there’s never enough time to do it right, but always enough time to do it over.”  
 
One could say that the U.S. program has operated under an artificial and in some respects 
continual pressure, some of it self-inflicted. At many times over the past 20 years, it 
seemed as if the next few months were critical to program survival. The initial Nuclear 
Waste Policy Act of 1982 helped create this atmosphere by legislating specific and very 
aggressive early dates for decisions together with an unrealistic 1998 date for initial 
operation without much consideration of the scientific, technical, programmatic, or 
institutional challenges and requirements. The Act and contracts with the utilities 
stipulated the beginning of spent fuel acceptance by January 31, 1998, in return for a fee 
that the utilities pay to support the program. This exacerbated programmatic pressure. 
This date is now well in the past and the utilities have sued the government for not 
meeting their contractual obligations. Ironically, the continual pressure to not only open 
the repository, but fill it quickly, often resulted in short term decisions to meet self-
imposed deadlines that resulted in further program delays. With a scheduled date of 
initial operation that has slipped more than 15 years in the past 20, naturally confidence 
in the program has suffered. Recent program decisions may finally be reflecting a 
growing appreciation of these circumstances. 
 
The “Rethinking” report made a number of suggestions about how to reshape the 
program. Most important was the recommendation that the program adopt an flexible, 
incremental approach. The program should be defined broadly and based on a learn-as-
you-go, improve-as-you-learn attitude. Such a program would not only be much better 
aligned with the unique technical challenges outlined before, it would provide 
opportunities to build stakeholder confidence. By involving stakeholders in decisions 
along the way, by responding to their concerns, and by delivering again and again on  
promises, one would have opportunities to earn trust. Building the program in stages—
with decision points to evaluate how best to proceed after each stage—would encourage 
optimization based upon experience. By building the actual repository in stages, for 
example with an initial pilot stage and a continuing research and development program, 
the implementer could demonstrate responsiveness, competence, and an ongoing 
commitment to continuous improvement. In Nevada, it’s highly unlikely to affect the 
position of state-level elected politicians any time soon, but it may pay dividends among 
the broad public in the longer term. 
 
This approach was further refined in a subsequent Academy report, “One Step at a 
Time”, issued in 2003. It defined and described in detail, “Adaptive Staging.” This 
approach can take full advantage of a repository’s unique features: 
 
  The repository is passive after completion; there are no moving parts; 
  Occurrences are not likely for a long time and in most cases would occur slowly, if at 
all; 
  If properly designed, there is no inherent energy to release materials; 
  It only becomes a repository upon closure, at a time when future generations are 
confident and comfortable with that decision; and 
  Until then, the process is reversible, and the waste is retrievable. 
 
With its focus on the disposal of spent fuel soon and rapidly, the U.S. program has not 
succeeded. In contrast, an adaptive approach leads to the possible redefinition of program 
success by including as key elements: 
 
  Identification of a suitable repository site, in the U.S., namely Yucca Mountain; 
  A license from the regulator for permanent disposal of the complete intended 
inventory; 
  The emplacement of an initial amount of waste to exercise operations and begin 
confirmatory work on system performance; 
  Improvements in system design and operation in subsequent stages based upon 
experience and lessons learned; 
  The option to emplace more waste; 
  A place to store the remaining waste in the meantime; 
 
The emphasis remains on the early establishment of the capability and demonstration of 
disposal, but allows for sequential decisions and pacing depending upon experiences in 
the initial stages and the unfolding of policy, programmatic, and societal requirements. 
 
Canada’s Recent Recommendation 
 
Recently Canada has embraced a comparable approach as it begins to reconfigure its 
program to manage spent or used fuel. In 1998, a Canadian federal independent 
environment assessment panel finished its review of Canada’s AECL proposal for deep 
geologic disposal. The Seaborn Panel, named after its chairman, made several 
fundamental conclusions in its final report, among them: 
 
  “From a technical perspective, safety of the AECL concept has been on balance 
adequately demonstrated for a conceptual stage of development, but from a social 
perspective, it has not;  
 
  “As it stands, the AECL concept for deep geologic disposal has not been demonstrated 
to have broad public support.  The concept in its current form does not have the required 
level of acceptability to be adopted as Canada’s approach for managing nuclear fuel 
wastes. 
 
  “Safety is a key part, but only one part, of acceptability. Safety must be viewed from 
two complementary perspectives: technical and social.” 
 
Following the Seaborn Report, the Government passed the Nuclear Fuel Waste Act in 
2002. The Act created the Nuclear Waste Management Organization (NWMO) and 
charged it to make recommendations within three years regarding the appropriate long-
term management for Canada’s spent fuel. NWMO analyzed in detail several potential 
methods for long-term management and disposition. Evaluation of three approaches were 
specifically required: at-reactor storage, centralized storage, and deep geologic disposal. 
NWMO has effectively incorporated what it terms “Adaptive Phased Management” into 
its recent recommendation to the Canadian Government on how the nation’s spent 
nuclear fuel should be managed. As they state in the NWMO recommendation report, 
“Choosing a Way Forward”: 
 
“…Canadians have expressed two complementary objectives. They are prepared to 
assume responsibility now for dealing with used fuel that has been created, but they also 
want to preserve the ability of future generations to do what they see as being in their best 
interests. 
 
“…The challenge of taking the long view demanded by this issue caused us to explore 
how we could build in sequential decision-making which would preserve flexibility 
during implementation in the coming years. 
 
“Adaptive Phased Management consists of both a technical method and a management 
system. The key attributes are: 
 
  “Ultimate centralized containment and isolation of used nuclear fuel in an appropriate  
geological formation; 
 
  Phased and adaptive decision-making; 
 
  Optional shallow storage at the central site prior to placement in the repository; 
 
  Continuous monitoring; 
 
  Provision for retrievability; and 
 
  Citizen engagement.” 
 
It will of great interest to see how the Canadian Government and affected parties respond 
to this recommended approach which resulted from a thorough analysis and an extensive 
and iterative engagement process. National reviews are also underway in Great Britain 
and France. 
 
Doing the Right Thing Right 
 
Recently, there has once again been discussion about slowing down or even halting the 
U.S. repository program. One can understand the frustration given the continuing 
difficulties and delays in preparing a suitable license application to the regulatory 
authority, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission; the continuing schedule slippages; large 
ongoing program costs; the intractable, if understandable, opposition from elected 
officials in the State of Nevada; and an environmental standard for licensing that is still 
not finalized.  
 
Some are now suggesting that we move to a program of extended interim storage, either 
at reactor sites or perhaps in one or more centralized locations. We could then turn our 
attention to developing new nuclear reactor and fuel cycle facilities that, if successful, 
might allow for the reprocessing (separation) and reuse of the unused uranium and 
produced plutonium, leaving only the residue wastes for ultimate disposal. The idea of 
partitioning and transmutation might someday even allow for reactors or accelerators that 
would burn long-lived waste products and leave wastes that would only be hazardous for 
centuries rather than millennia. And perhaps it might delay the need for additional 
repositories. 
 
Research and development on these new frontiers has much to recommend it. There are 
very large uncertainties and exciting scientific challenges to make such a system a reality. 
However, we are very far from confident that such work will result in a practical, 
effective, economic system. Even then it will take literally generations of remarkably 
stable, highly organized, and integrated programs to deal with all of the nation’s spent 
fuel. Anything less would leave the waste situation unresolved and potentially more 
intractable. Even if successful, a repository would be needed for residual wastes.  
 
It is also hard to imagine public acceptance based upon an unproven, highly 
sophisticated, and very costly program that would last decades before it has a significant 
impact. How would the nuclear community make a convincing case for a resurgence of 
nuclear power if its actions communicate an inability to solve the disposition of the 
wastes from the current generation of reactors? Will citizens and political leaders will be 
willing to buy the promise of a solution far in the future based on the creation of a large 
fleet of second generation, yet-to-be-tested, advanced nuclear plants and new fuel cycle 
facilities? Serious, sustained U.S. participation and leadership in international efforts to 
create the next generation of nuclear facilities and a secure new nuclear regime are 
needed. But not at the expense of a protracted delay or derailment of Yucca Mountain. 
 
The U.S. repository program doesn’t need nuclear power nearly as much as nuclear 
power needs the repository program. The reasons why the program is needed are no 
different than when the Congress passed the original Nuclear Waste Policy Act in 1982. 
Setting aside economics and technology issues, the rationale is straightforward public 
policy based on doing what is right. This generation is benefiting from the nuclear power 
and can and should meet its obligation to provide a clear and safe option for disposal. It 
should bear the political, institutional, and economic costs while preserving the ability of 
future generations to do what they see as in their best interests. Without a final 
environmental standard, the licensing of Yucca mountain cannot be considered a 
certainty. But keeping the program vibrant and moving it forward is important. 
Fortunately, an adaptively staged program can do just that. 
 
Public Acceptance Derives from Trust 
 
An adaptive approach also provides the best opportunity to address the major challenge 
of public acceptance. Many studies have been conducted to understand the causes of 
public trust or mistrust of controversial decisions. Nuclear waste management has 
frequently been the focus for obvious reasons. Often it is suggested that the lack of public 
acceptance and trust arise from insufficient public information and public involvement 
programs. Certainly such activities are necessary. But what waste management programs 
around the world demonstrate is that these efforts are necessary but not sufficient. Trust 
arises in repository programs for the same reasons people trust (or don’t) their local 
police, fire departments, teachers, or political representatives.  
 
Trust is more evident when the authorities are well known and have demonstrated three 
important features: 
 
  The authority is seen as highly competent and a has demonstrated track record of 
competence; 
  The authority is seen as caring about the affected community and making decisions 
with the communities best interests foremost in mind; and 
  The authority engages the affected community and involved stakeholders throughout 
the process and is willing to modify program elements to respond to their concerns, rather 
than trying to talk them out of their concerns. 
 
By staging a program, the implementing authority creates many opportunities to promise 
and deliver on program progress and content. Such a program is built on the premise that 
adaptation and flexibility are virtues and attributes that benefit both program 
implementers and stakeholders. 
 
An essential feature of an adaptive staged approach is the way it addresses the most 
challenging scientific and societal challenges. It allows for full-scale disposal, but does 
not mandate the entire schedule or final disposition (which, in reality, it cannot do 
anyway). It provides future generations the prospect of a permanent solution, and 
importantly, the flexibility to do what they see as in their best interests at the time. If 
everything goes well, it is our grandchildren’s grandchildren, not we, who will be 
positioned to make an informed decision when and under what circumstances to close the 
repository. 
 
The Coming Opportunity 
 
There is one recent development on the horizon that may play an increasingly important 
role in shaping successful repository programs:  security concerns. They are arising with 
the anticipated growth and spread of nuclear power and its associated fuel cycle 
capabilities. The fissionable materials used in nuclear weapons come from either uranium 
enrichment or the reprocessing of spent fuel to extract plutonium. From the beginning of 
nuclear power the dual use nature of enrichment and reprocessing have been well 
understood; the same facilities needed to make and process nuclear power reactor fuel 
can be modified to make weapons usable materials. 
 
Recent initiatives have been proposed by many, including President Bush and IAEA 
Director-General Mohammed ElBaradei, to limit the spread of these sensitive nuclear 
facilities. An international network to provide assurances of fresh fuel and take back 
spent fuel could dramatically reduce or eliminate the need for additional countries to 
develop their own enrichment or reprocessing capabilities while fully preserving their 
ability to pursue nuclear power.  
 
Of course, the promise of the return of spent fuel to the country of origin or to a third 
country does not eliminate and may heighten the issue of its ultimate disposition. Many 
features of such an arrangement will have to be carefully defined and developed before 
an effective international framework can be established. Nevertheless, this approach 
holds out the possibility of repositories being transformed from perceived waste dumps to 
integral elements of a security-based international network. The network could include 
regional or multi-national facilities and would provide developing countries with the 
ability to meet growing energy demand while reducing proliferation and security 
concerns. Doing the right thing may some day lead to greater public understanding and 
acceptance of the important role of repositories in realizing a world with adequate energy, 
environmental integrity, and enhanced security. 
